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Artisanal mining and the rationalisation of informality: critical reflections 
from Liberia1  
Roy Maconachie and Felix Marco Conteh 
 




Across sub-Saharan Africa, artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) represents a major source of 
direct and indirect employment. Yet, despite the livelihood benefits and the growing interest from 
governments, donors and policy makers to formalise ASM, most artisanal miners still operate 
informally. Focusing on Liberia, this article critically investigates the question of why formalisation 
efforts continue to fail and argues that the persistence of informality in the sector needs to first be 
understood as a rational strategy for those who profit from it. Only then can sustainable mining 
reforms be linked to broader national and international extractive sector policy frameworks. 
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Introduction 
The Africa Mining Vision (AMV), a comprehensive policy framework created by the African Union 
in 2009, seeks to ensure that African nations utilise their mineral resources strategically for broad-
based, inclusive development. Now, a decade after its inception, the implementation of AMV 
policies has been challenging, as has its goal of fostering the “transparent, equitable and optimal 
exploitation of Africa’s mineral resources to underpin broad based sustainable growth and socio-
economic development” (African Union, 2009: v).  While much of the focus of the AMV has been 
on large-scale, capital intensive mining investment, one of its objectives is to boost and support 
artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) activities – low-tech, labour intensive mineral extraction 
and processing. More specifically, following Cluster 4 in the AMV’s Action Plan, African Union 
(AU) member states, it is stated, should seek to formalise ASM, providing technical support to the 
sector and prioritising it as a focus of national poverty reduction strategies. 
                                                          




The AMV recognises the developmental importance of ASM across the African continent, 
supporting the academic research that has been carried out in recent years. While it is now widely 
accepted that ASM constitutes a major source of livelihoods and employment for millions of poor 
people around the world, the precise number of artisanal miners in sub-Saharan Africa is unclear. 
One estimate suggests that as many as 20 million individuals are directly employed by the sector, 
with an additional 100 million people indirectly dependent on its many interrelated activities for 
their livelihoods (Hilson et al. 2017, 80). Yet, despite its importance as a non-farm economic 
activity, most ASM activities are firmly situated in “spaces” of persistent and intractable 
informality, often characterised by exploitation, trans-border crimes and some of the worst forms of 
human rights violations, including child labour (Salo et al. 2016; Maconachie and Hilson 2011, 
2016; Schipper, de Haan, and van Dorp 2015; O’Driscoll 2017; Amnesty International 2016; 
Banchirigah 2008; International Labour Organisation 1999). By and large, for most governments 
and policy makers in sub-Saharan Africa, the sector has been defined by its illegality and 
informality, thriving outside the formal state regulation, with most activities unlicensed and 
operating with little or no formal support (Okoh and Hilson 2011; International Labour Organisation 
1999; Siegel and Veiga 2009). In many African countries, the largely unregulated nature of ASM 
reinforces its informality, as transactions among elite actors are strengthened by informal practices 
within the confines of informal “spaces” (Hilson et al. 2017), leading to loss of revenues for 
governments and low returns for artisanal miners at the bottom of the value chain.  
Unsurprisingly, the many missed opportunities for mineral-rich countries to effectively 
harness the ASM potential have led to persistent calls for formalisation, including from within the 
AMV, as a panacea capable of permanently solving the problems of artisanal operators (Siwale and 
Siwale 2017; Siegel and Veiga 2009; International Labour Organisation 1999; Maconachie and 
Hilson 2011; Salo et al. 2016). The case for the formalisation of ASM has been made by academics, 
practitioners and international development agencies, such that it has now almost become irrational 
for governments not to pursue it, given the many benefits (Siegel and Veiga 2009). For example, 
Siwale and Siwale (2017) have argued that proponents of formalisation envisage that the process 
will lead to operators having secured titles, invariably leading to the consolidation of property laws 
and their enforcement by states. Formalisation can also promote miners’ visibility and provide a 
framework through which governments can facilitate technical support and lines of credit for 
miners. It is thus argued that formalisation will invariably result in governments being able not only 
to tax miners, but to effectively provide a framework to “better govern and consequently manage 
the social and environmental impacts of mining” (Salo et al. 2016 1058–1059), as well as allowing 
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miners to better forecast their taxes, “rather than having to pay the hidden cost of bribes” (Siegel 
and Veiga 2009, 52). 
The “rationality” argument for the formalisation of ASM therefore makes the following 
question inevitable: if the sector has the potential to reduce unemployment, support livelihoods and 
alleviate poverty in developing countries, while simultaneously boosting government revenues, why 
has reform continued to be undermined? Indeed, in many African countries, it would appear that in 
contrast to the increasing recognition of the importance of ASM by developing countries’ 
governments and donors (Hilson et al. 2017; Maconachie and Hilson 2011), the sector’s informality 
has become entrenched and intractable (Schoneveld et al. 2018; Jǿnsson and Fold 2014).  
Drawing upon multi-sited fieldwork carried out in northwest Liberia (see Figure 1) and 
complemented by semi-structured interviews with government officials, policy makers and donors 
in Monrovia, this article explores the entrenched and persistent informality that characterises the 
country’s artisanal mining sector. In doing so, it reinforces the impassioned and at times proselyting 
efforts to convince local and international stakeholders of the benefits of formalisation, but argues 
that understanding the rationality of informality, at least from the perspectives of those who profit 
from it, is critical for overcoming its persistence. Only then will efforts to link the formalisation 
process to broader extractive sector reforms, such as the AMV, gain traction.  




One of the greatest challenges to formalising ASM is that the persistence of informality is 
being driven by the many vested interests of elite actors who continue to control decision making 
in the sector. In exploring the case of Liberia, the arguments developed in the article contribute to a 
growing body of critical literature on the formalisation of ASM, which recognises the need for more 
grounded research that explores the complex political-economic realities that drive informality. In 
doing so, the article builds on, and adds to, the work of other scholars who provide similar case 
study analysis of formalisation in other contexts. For example, Banchirigah (2008) and Siwale and 
Siwale (2017), provide insightful case studies on the persistence of informality in Ghana and 
Zambia, respectively. Alternatively, Maconachie and Hilson (2011) further make reference to some 
of the challenges in Sierra Leone, while Van Bockstael (2014) provides some of the first detailed 
analysis on Liberia.  
However, while this article alludes to the limited capacity of states to effectively formalise 
ASM, as other previous works have done (see, for example, Siwale and Siwale 2017; Maconachie 
and Hilson 2011; Banchirigah 2008; Bockstael 2014), it also goes further to explore how elite 
bargaining strategies link and solidify relationships between national and local elites. Moreover, it 
illustrates how the rational, albeit problematic, distinction that officials make between personalised 
sources of revenue and those accruable to the state, contribute to the reinforcement of informality 
in the sector. This, of course, has important implications for the uptake of formalisation strategies 
within the AMV. Ultimately, the article finds that ASM is rapidly changing, outpacing the response 
rate of policy makers, who, even when there is the will to reform, continue to adopt and implement 
“hit-and-miss” approaches. 
The article is structured as follows. The section following this introduction examines in 
detail the foundations of informality in Liberia’s AM sector, contextually situating the article’s 
argument. The third section provides a critical overview of post-war reforms in ASM, suggesting 
that the imperative of winning international approval and the need to lift diamond export sanctions, 
more than any other consideration, were central to such reforms which were eventually hybridised. 
The fourth section analyses and critiques the most recent reform programme The Regulatory 
Roadmap for the Artisanal Mining Sector in Liberia, which aims to decentralise the licensing 
process and adopt mining cooperatives to formalise the sector. The fifth section provides some 





Liberia and the historical foundations of informality 
Liberia has never been able to develop a successful large-scale diamond mining industry, mainly 
due to the lack of commercially viable kimberlite deposits. It has a relatively small diamond mining 
sector, compared with neighbouring Sierra Leone (Interview with Manager, Government Diamond 
Office, Monrovia, 27 April 2017; Bockstael 2014; Shaw and Deady, n/d). Although the first 
discoveries of diamonds in Liberia were reported in 1906 (Bockstael 2014), it was not until the 
1950s and1960s that the first major finds were made, when the Diamond Mining Company of 
Liberia was able to identify several potential kimberlite dykes as part of its exploration programme 
(Shaw and Deady, n.d.). The diamond industry has consequently been dominated by artisanal 
mining, most of which remains largely informal and unregulated. The paucity of reliable data on the 
ASM sector constitutes a major challenge for the sector (Deputy Ministry of Planning, Ministry of 
Mines, Monrovia, 5 May 2017; Deputy Director of Mines, Monrovia, 26 April 2017). The Ministry 
of Mines has officially registered about 1,000 operators in the gold and diamond mining sector, but 
it is public knowledge that there are thousands of illegal miners operating all over the country 
(Deputy Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Mines, Monrovia, 5 May 2017). Other studies have 
estimated that the sector provides a livelihood for some 100,000 miners in the country (Sandhu 
2016; World Bank 2012). There are no reliable estimates of the actual production and value of 
Liberia’s diamonds, but for 2016 and 2015, the country exported about US$ 30 million and US$ 35 
million of diamonds, respectively. One estimate puts the country’s annual output of diamonds in 
1956 at 1 million carats (Bockstael 2014), declining considerably in the 1970s to 600,000 carats and 
cumulatively in the last 50 years to 14 million carats (Shaw and Deady, n.d., 3). 
However, given the political economy of the country’s diamond mining industry, it is 
important to view diamond production and export figures with caution. The “open door” policy of 
the Tubman government in the 1950s made Liberia an appealing destination for investors (World 
Bank 2016; Forde 2011; Clower et al. 1966; Interview with former Minister of Information, 
Government of Liberia, Monrovia, 28 August 2017). This also allowed the country to attract 
smuggled diamonds from its neighbours, an attraction further enhanced by Liberia’s use of the 
United States dollar as its primary currency, as well as the limited imposition of taxes on imports 
and exports (Greenhalgh 1983). The impact of smuggled Sierra Leonean diamonds was significant; 
President Tubman is reported to have acknowledged that Liberia’s exports consisted mostly of 
diamonds from Sierra Leone (Bockstael 2014; Stanley 1970). This mismatch between actual 
production capacity and diamond exports has persisted to this day. For example, while the Ministry 
of Lands, Energy and Mines (MLEM) reported the total diamond export for 1998 to be US$ 
6 
 
800,000, officials in Belgium estimated actual diamond imports from Liberia during that year to be 
US$ 217 million (United Nations 2000), indicating that much of its export had come from 
neighbouring countries, especially Sierra Leone.  
Interviews with current and past governments of Liberia officials indicated that for a long 
time, the mining of diamonds was not a major preoccupation for either the government or the local 
people, given that the country was almost entirely reliant on the mining revenues it derived from the 
operations of the country’s three large-scale iron ore mines (Interview with Deputy Minister for 
Planning, Ministry of Lands, Energy and Mines, Monrovia, 5 May 2017). This dependence has in 
many ways reinforced the large-scale mining bias held by the government towards the sector. As 
the Deputy Director of Mines put it:  
What I gather is that there is a place in the West, in the Kumo area, going to Sierra Leone, 
where people used to find diamonds, because there’s a Kimberlite dyke that runs along that 
area. What I heard was that during the Tubman era, people were finding diamonds, especially 
after a heavy downpour of rain. So people started to mine. But people from Sierra Leone 
crossed the border to come and also mine. So the government stopped it. But later, the 
government realised that there were some economic benefits, as it was making the people 
self-employed [and] creating employment. So the government established the bureau of 
mines (Interview with Deputy Director of Mines, Monrovia, 26 April 2017). 
Although by the late 1970s some companies were exploring and operating along the Yambasi Creek 
and Lofa River, many focused exclusively on alluvial diamond deposits. According to Shaw and 
Deady (n.d., 4), the seasonal nature of alluvial mining characterised by “flooding, poor access and 
the erratic distribution of diamond-bearing gravels meant that many companies were ultimately 
unsuccessful” in sustaining their operations. The country’s alluvial diamond mines were later 
nationalised in the 1980s by President Samuel Doe, under the pretext of “maximising benefits” from 
the country’s wealth. But nationalisation quickly became a basis for the personalisation of the 
country’s diamond mines by President Doe and his crony, Charles Taylor, who was at the time the 
head of Liberia’s General Services Agency (Interview with former Minister of Information, 
Government of Liberia, Monrovia, 28 August 2017). Doe and Taylor subsequently had a 
disagreement over the “management” of diamond proceeds, which eventually led to the 
redeployment of the latter and his subsequent departure from the country (Interview with former 
Minister of Information, Government of Liberia, Monrovia, 28 August 2017). During the second 
Liberian civil war, it has been reported that Taylor, who had been elected President in 1997 (Levitt 
2005), frequently demanded diamonds from artisanal miners in return for protection as well as to 
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finance his war efforts (Interview with Senior Patrolman, Varguay Mining Agency, Lofa Bridge, 16 
May 2017), and the personalisation of revenues accrued from the country’s natural resources, 
including timber, became a hallmark of his rule (Global Witness 2001).  
Post war reforms and the reinforcement of informality  
Since the end of the war in 2003, the government of Liberia has taken steps to reform its artisanal 
mining sector. However, many of these reforms have been largely driven by external pressures, 
either as part of conditions for the country to be able to export diamonds through the internationally 
accepted and recognised multilateral Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPSC), or as part of 
donor conditionalities for the delivery of aid (Interview with Western donor official, Monrovia, 14 
September 2017). For instance, cognisant of the need to secure debt relief and to boost Liberia’s 
image as a reform-minded government, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf made compliance with the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) a key priority after she was elected in 2005 
(O’Sullivan 2013, 11). Although she demonstrated significant political will to get the UN to lift 
sanctions that had been imposed on the country in 2000 (O’Sullivan 2013, 11; Sovacool and 
Andrews 2015; Bockstael 2014), her commitment to reform progressively declined (Interview with 
Head of the Liberia Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, Monrovia, 5 April 2017; O’Sullivan 
2013, 11; Sovacool and Andrews 2015).  
With respect to the regulation of the artisanal mining sector, the government subsequently 
adopted a dualistic approach, allowing the old pre-war system governed by mining agencies to 
coexist with a new and parallel structure to implement the framework of the KPSC, to be overseen 
by regional officers. As one condition for lifting sanctions on diamond exports in 2007, the 
government established the Government Diamond Office (GDO), with the further creation of 10 
regional offices in each of the country’s mining zones, to manage the movement and certification 
of diamonds through the KPSC (Interview with Regional Officer, Government Diamond Office, 
Lofa Bridge, 16 May 2017; Interview with Regional Officer, Government Diamond Office, Mano 
River Kongo, 14 February 2018). Although, in theory, the GDO regional officers are part of the 
MLEM, they are relatively well-resourced with motorbikes and salaries more than three times that 
of the mining agents. However, they are also somewhat physically isolated, being housed in better 
quality offices than the mining agents, who have traditionally regulated artisanal mining activities 
at the field level (Interview with Regional Officer, Government Diamond Office, Mano River 
Kongo, 14 February 2018). As such, the post-war artisanal mining reforms that have been propelled 
by international pressure, have not only led to the creation of two parallel administration systems 
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for mining activities, but have also led to a hierarchical and administratively diverse governance 
structure, in which different sets of actors are motivated by different incentives, leading to 
administrative competition, rather than cooperation. Indeed, interviews with mining agents and 
GDO regional officers show the disparity between the conditions of service for the two sets of 
personnel and their adaptation strategies. As one mining agent explained in relation to the lack of a 
suitable office structures: 
There is no office built by the Ministry for mining agencies. Sometimes you just take one 
room and make it your office because you don’t have an office. I built this one. Some miners 
are good and we … [tell] them that we can’t keep waiting for government even though they 
have their policy, so we need help. Then some send people to help with the bricks, some 
provide the zinc, some provide the cement and other things (Interview with Mining Agent, 
Gold Camp, 18 May 2017). 
The difficulties of formalising the artisanal mining sector in Liberia have often been attributed to 
the many capacity challenges faced by the state (Bockstael 2014). However, one can also see a 
deliberate act of prioritisation that privileges the GDO over the mining agents, given that the 
certification of diamonds in ways that meet the requirements of the KPSC is more important than 
the general regulation of the sector. A further challenge has to do with the staff needed to effectively 
regulate the sector. All the mining agents interviewed in this study indicated that they had a serious 
shortage of staff, with one agent noting, “most of our workers are not on salary and they are not on 
the pay roll of the Ministry” (Interview with Mining Agent, Lofa Bridge, 16 May 2017). One mining 
agent further explained how he would divide his monthly salary of US$ 100 among himself and his 
two volunteer patrolmen: “If I take L$ 10,000, I will come and give them L$ 3,000. One would get 
L$ 1,500 and L$ 1,500 for the other” (Interview with Mining Agent, Gold Camp, 18 May 2017).1  
The significant differences in service conditions and access to other resources have led to 
administrative jealousies and tensions, which have been exacerbated by an initial lack of clarity in 
the roles of GDO regional officers in the mining sites (Interview with Regional Officer, Government 
Diamond Office, Mano River Kongo, 14 February 2018). Mining agents have questioned the rights 
and powers of regional officers to visit the mines, as they were initially expected to wait for miners 
to bring diamonds to them to initiate the KPSC (Interview with Mining Agent, Gold Camp, 18 May 
2017). Although many mining agents have justified their concerns on the basis of preventing the 
regional officers from being bribed by miners (Interview with Mining Agent, Gold Camp, 18 May 
2017), their claim of administrative overreach by the latter could also be seen as subterfuge and a 
9 
 
rather insidious way of preventing the regional officers from understanding the relationships that 
they have forged with the miners. As one GDO regional officer noted during an interview: 
Mining agents keep complaining that we have better conditions of service, but they make 
more money than us. They have the clearance fees, and deal with diamond theft cases from 
which they can get money from miners when diamonds are recovered (Interview with 
Regional Officer, Government Diamond Office, Mano River Kongo, 14 February 2018).  
Apart from the need to meet the requirements of the KPSC, other imperatives underline its 
prioritisation over the general formalisation of artisanal mining, which allow officials to make a 
distinction between the licencing and general regulatory regime and the KP. The Mineral and 
Mining Act (MMA) of 2000 identifies three classes of miners – A, B and C. Class A miners are 
predominantly multinational corporations that use heavy machinery. As a first step, they carry out 
up to five years of exploration and reconnaissance, before identifying an exploitable deposit and 
commencing full mining operations. Class B operators are small-scale firms which can be jointly 
owned by foreign investors and Liberian nationals, and are mainly engaged in the mining of gold 
(there were no small-scale diamond mining companies operating at the time of writing). Like Class 
A operators, they are permitted to use heavy machinery. Class C licences, in contrast, are issued to 
Liberian nationals only, by law. As explained by the Deputy Director of Mines:  
Class C serves as employment for the typical Liberian. What happens is that if he takes 25 
acres of land and mines diamonds on it, he brings in shovel boys – six, seven, eight, nine or 
ten of them. It depends on his financial strength. We’re not in control over who works on 
their claims or this and that, even though we monitor them for bad mining practices and 
prevent illegal mining (Interview with Deputy Director of Mines, Monrovia, 26 April 2017). 
Class C licences are usually issued for an area not exceeding 25 acres, which Van Bockstael (2014) 
has described as “unrealistically high”, and each miner is entitled to a maximum of four claims. The 
relatively large area that a Class C licence covers is partly reflective of the lack of geological data, 
as miners employ a “guess and miss approach” on the claims (Interview with Deputy Minister for 
Planning, Ministry of Lands, Energy and Mines, Monrovia, 5 May 2017). Under a newly developed 
roadmap for the formalisation of artisanal mining, the MLEM plans to reduce the size of mining 
claims from 25 acres to more “realistic” plots for miners to manage. Although the law prohibits the 
use of heavy machinery in artisanal mining claims, the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) has 
recently started issuing “special permits” to artisanal miners on the advice of the Ministry of Lands, 
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Energy and Mines, especially for those registered as part of cooperatives (Interview with Assistant 
Manager, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, EPA, Monrovia, 27 April 2017).  
The regulatory regime of artisanal mining remains informal, and it is within this persistence 
of informality that one can begin to understand the prioritisation process of the government. A 
baseline survey conducted before the implementation of a USAID supported project “Property 
Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development” (PRADD) revealed that 61.8 per cent of miners 
surveyed were illegal and that many of them were known to the local authorities and permitted to 
mine by the mining agents (Linkow 2011). Van Bockstael’s (2014) study of the interaction between 
miners and local mining agents also revealed a similar trend in which informal agreements made 
between them served as localised, albeit illegitimate form of formalisation. The end-line survey for 
the PRADD project reported two years later that “about three quarters of miners reported having no 
valid licence for their claim” (Tetra Tech ARD 2013, iii). The process of securing a Class C licence 
provides considerable insight into the rationality of informality and the ways in which different 
actors in the hierarchical registration chain benefit from informality.  
Liberia’s mining regions are divided into different mining zones. Each zone is in turn sub-
divided into smaller zones, each of which is headed by a mining chairman who is elected or selected 
by local miners. The long process of registration thus starts with the mining chairmen together with 
their teams of volunteer patrolmen, who are responsible for checking the suitability of an area for 
which a miner would need a licence. Interviews with miners revealed that they must pay a non-
refundable fee of US$ 20 for the chairman’s recommendation letter to the mining agent. Upon 
receipt of the mining chairman’s recommendation letter, the mining agent would then visit the 
prospective mining site, and if satisfied, issue a “clearance” for an unreceipted fee ranging from 
US$ 100–150. Whereas in theory the “clearance” is a recommendation for miners to proceed with 
their applications to the MLEM in Monrovia (Interview with Mining Agent, Gold Camp, 18 May 
2017; Interview with Mining Agent, Lofa Bridge, 16 May 2017), in practice, it has been used as a 
temporary licence for the miners to commence mining activities while they work to raise the rest of 
the licence fees, a practice which invariably encourages informality (Sandhu 2016; Bockstael 2014). 
One female miner near Lofa Bridge alleged during an interview that she was asked to pay US$ 150 
by the local mining agent, because she was a woman, emphasising that men were often asked to pay 
less (Interview with miner, Near Lofa Bridge, 17 May 2017).  
The miner’s allegation of paying more because of her gender is plausible, but what happened 
to her should be understood beyond notions of gender-based exploitation, as it reflects the general 
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predatory characteristic of the licencing process, with officials exploiting vulnerable and 
unsuspecting miners at every stage of the process, regardless of their gender. In a related vein, a 
recent study of everyday corruption in Francophone West Africa revealed that public officials take 
advantage of the desperation of service users in obtaining services, as well as their general lack of 
knowledge of official charges (Blundo et al. 2006). In the case of Liberia, the clearance fee is an 
example of an administrative practice which although illegal, has become completely acceptable as 
part of everyday interaction among artisanal miners. One GDO regional officer who was once 
himself a mining agent explained that: 
The payment of a clearance fee is an old-age practice. It started way back in the 1950s and 
1960s, and it’s not paid into government accounts. It remains with the mining agent. The 
mining agent has patrolmen who are not paid salaries, it is this money he uses to give them 
something like a stipend, and everybody knows that (Interview with Regional Officer, 
Government Diamond Office, Mano River Kongo, 14 February 2018). 
Viewed in a different light, this practice is akin to the MLEM abdicating its responsibility, with the 
understanding that the mining agents are engaged in practices that sustain the presence of a vital 
state institution and function, albeit through exploitative and illegal means. Although it is not clear 
whether proceeds from the clearance fees eventually find their way to Monrovia, given that officials 
in the MLEM are aware of the practice, the large number of unassigned mining agents waiting to 
be (re)deployed likely serves as an incentive for those agents “in post” to seek “protection” from 
their bosses in Monrovia on patron-client terms (Interview with Mining Agent, Gold Camp, 18 May 
2017). Indeed the chain of officials that miners have to navigate does not stop with the mining agents 
in the regions. Miners’ applications must go through at least four more stages, involving negotiations 
at the office of the Chief of Records, the Cadastre Office, with the Director of Mines, and with the 
Assistant Minister (Interview with Mining Agent, Lofa Bridge, 16 May 2017; Interview with 
Mining Agent, Gold Camp, 18 May 2017). In explaining her experience navigating the MLEM in 
Monrovia, the female miner who allegedly paid US$ 150 to the mining agent recounted the situation:  
Any office you enter you’ll have to give something. You do it small, small. You go to the 
other office, and you give them something. You’ll have to spend a lot of money until you get 
your licence. Despite this, sometimes it’ll take four or more months to get your licence 
(Interview with miner, Near Lofa Bridge, 17 May 2017). 
Once the miners submit their documents to the MLEM, a surveyor is sent to survey the site, at which 
point the miner will have to pay US$ 150. Following this, another US$ 150 is paid for the actual 
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Class C licence (Interview with Deputy Director of Mines, Monrovia, 26 April 2017). Various other 
studies have documented the similar challenges that miners must endure to enter the leagal domain, 
most notably having to pay illegal fees and facing long delays in securing their licences (Sandhu 
2016; Bockstael 2014; Hilson and Bockstael 2011; Tetra Tech ARD 2013; Linkow 2011). In fact, 
for the typical artisanal miner:  
The most important reason for not obtaining a license was said to be the cost. In addition, 
several miners reported long delays of up to six months in receiving their licenses even after 
they had paid the fee (Tetra Tech ARD 2013, 5).  
The cumulative effect of this bureaucratically induced informality which is the result of the 
“rational” calculations that officials make, has been widespread illegal mining operations. In 
addition to the exorbitant licencing fees and the persistent delays in the issuance of licences, 
interviews with civil society activists revealed an even bigger challenge that involves the direct 
ownership of several mining claims by officials of the Ministry of Mines. One official who has 
worked in the extractive sector for a long time, including for the government industry and, at the 
time of writing, was with one of the country’s main donors, painted a picture in which vested 
interests have played a significant role in reinforcing the absence of political and administrative will 
to formalise and effectively regulate the sector. He noted that:  
Artisanal mining is the most challenging part of natural resources governance in this country. 
It is a sector in which I think not much has been done in terms of regulation. From the look 
of things entities of government and officials have a greater hand in artisanal mining. They 
make it look simple; they make it look common; and licenses are given to some of them who 
are officials; they own pits and mining sites, because people think it is smaller. But in terms 
of resources, in terms of what comes from it, it is huge. But the promotion of it for the 
government and the public good is actually downplayed (Interview with donor official, 
Monrovia, 9 May 2017). 
Such sentiments suggest that officials make a rationalised distinction between resources they can 
personalise on the one hand, and those accruable to the state and the general citizenry, on the other 
hand. This, of course, is a practice that is not only restricted to the governance of artisanal mining, 
but also extends to the management of resources flowing from the large-scale mining sector. For 
example, interviews with government and donor officials, as well as civil society activists, revealed 
the extent to which the Social Development Fund (SDF) established by President Sirleaf in 2006 – 
a fund designed to ensure that large-scale mining companies contributed to the development of 
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mining host communities – has been captured by a range of elite actors, including members of the 
house of legislature, county superintendents and district commissioners (Interview with donor 
official, Monrovia, 9 May 2017; Interview with Head of the Liberia Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative, Monrovia, 5 April 2017; Interview with Deputy Minister for Planning, 
Ministry of Lands, Energy and Mines, Monrovia, 5 May 2017; Interview with Controller General 
Ministry of Finance, Monrovia, 29 August 2017). The General Auditing Commission of Liberia, 
which has been auditing the management of the SDF, has published several reports detailing the 
widespread misuse of the fund (Gaye 2014a, 2014b). As is noted in one report focusing on Nimba 
County, which hosts the country’s biggest iron ore mining company, ArcelorMittal: 
The activities undertaken by the Nimba County Administration in the management of the 
Social and County Development Funds were marred with a number of irregularities. The 
financial irregularities noted amounted to US$1,449,710.60 and involved unsupported 
payments and withdrawals, third party payments, non-compliance with relevant laws and 
regulations (Gaye 2014a, 50).  
Focus group discussions with communities affected by the operations of the company in Nimba 
County – Gbapa and Zolowe – indicated that while they are generally knowledgeable of what the 
company should be contributing annually as part of its contributions to community development, 
the funds were systematically captured by elites in several layers of government, leaving 
communities to deal with the negative consequences of mining, including environmental 
degradation. While informality within the extractive sector is prevalent, its intractability is 
nonetheless an issue that needs to be recognised if effective and sustainable measures to address it 
are to be found. The most recent initiative the government has put in place to formalise the sector – 
The Regulatory Roadmap for the Artisanal Mining Sector in Liberia – appears to have done little so 
far to address the root causes of the problems that mining communities face. 
 
Can a “roadmap” lead to the formalisation of artisanal mining? 
In 2016, the MLEM launched The Regulatory Roadmap for the Artisanal Mining Sector in Liberia, 
a blueprint for the formalisation of artisanal mining. The document identifies eight key policy 
themes: 1) decentralisation of MLME governance structures; 2) improvement of accessibility to 
artisanal mining licenses; 3) tracking and reporting of mineral production and sales; 4) piloting of 
umbrella organisations/“cooperatives”; 5) spatial mapping of artisanal mines in Liberia; 6) 
improvement of environment management practices; 7) enhancement of health, safety and security 
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practices; and 8) demonstration of social responsibility (Sandhu 2016, 16). Perhaps the most striking 
aspect of the document is its clear definition of formalisation within the context of Liberia, as 
follows: 
The process of implementing reforms and regulations that strengthen the MLME’s 
institutional and financial capacity to govern the artisanal mining sector; that enhances 
tracing of minerals and monitoring of the sector; that enhances the environmental and social 
performance of the sector; and – most crucially – that provides positive incentives and 
benefits to miners, host communities and the government, in the form of livelihoods 
development and increased revenue generation from the sector (Sandhu 2016, 28). 
 
Given the lack of clarity in the literature as to what formalisation actually entails, Liberia’s roadmap 
definition, which is context specific, provides a rare departure from the vague framework within 
which the process is often discussed. Here, formalisation involves building the capacity of the 
MLEM to effectively manage the sector, while at the same time increasing the government’s 
revenue, ensuring that the process is one that leads to win–win–win outcomes for the government, 
miners and communities. However, given the aforementioned challenges that have inhibited the 
formalisation process, it is intriguing that the government has suddenly developed an interest in 
formalising the sector. Commenting on the large-scale mining bias stance of the past, a World Bank 
publication noted that, “the Ministry of Lands Mines and Energy (MLME) focuses on large-scale 
mines, viewing artisanal mining as an impediment to progress in the mining sector” (World Bank 
2012, 13), and has therefore not invested much in the sector, given the limited return on investment. 
For instance, although the implementation of the KPCS led to a US$ 1 million increase in 
government revenue from the artisanal mining sector in 2008, this was achieved at the high 
“implementation cost of close to US$ 10 million, while up to 90 per cent of mined diamonds 
continue to leave’ the country unofficially” (Carstens et al. 2009, 64). While it is plausible that 
issues of value for money have previously shaped the government’s position, the roadmap provides 
clear insight into the rationale for the current move, which stems largely from the current financial 
difficulties of the government. These financial challenges were further compounded by the 2014 
drop in commodity prices, especially of iron ore, on which Liberia’s budget had been anchored, and 
the impact of the Ebola epidemic of 2014–2015. As the document noted:  
 
Declining global commodity prices, particularly the rapidly declining price of iron ore which 
constitutes a significant mineral endowment in Liberia, as well as the adverse impacts of the 
Ebola outbreak in 2014 and 2015, have significantly reduced investor confidence in Liberia. 
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With limited large-scale industrial mining, and an absence of a formalised artisanal mining 
sector, mining is not producing the concrete socio-economic benefits that stakeholders had 
envisioned (Sandhu 2016, 10).  
 
Although one of the key objectives of most formalisation programmes is ensuring that the 
government derives revenue from the sector, such a goal can easily conflict with the objective of 
improving miners’ livelihoods and alleviating poverty, if the process is not carefully thought 
through. The Deputy Minister of Mines responsible for the development and implementation of the 
roadmap, de-emphasised the imperatives of taxation in the government’s drive to formalisation 
(Interview with Deputy Minister for Planning, Ministry of Lands, Energy and Mines, Monrovia, 5 
May 2017), even though the Liberia Revenue Authority (LRA) has been a key stakeholder 
throughout the consultation process, leading to the development of the roadmap (Sandhu 2016). One 
donor official supporting the process raised concerns over the taxation plans of the government, 
noting that taxation without any meaningful investment in the sector to support the miners, either in 
the form of access to credit or equipment, would likely serve as the biggest threat to the 
implementation of the roadmap (Interview with Western donor official, Monrovia, 2 May 2017).  
 
At the centre of the strategy that is laid out in the roadmap, the government has identified mining 
cooperatives as the main conduit through which it intends to formalise the artisanal mining sector 
(Interview with Deputy Minister for Planning, Ministry of Lands, Energy and Mines, Monrovia, 5 
May 2017; Sandhu 2016). Each cooperative will be composed of a minimum of 15 miners and 
provided with “the opportunity for members to engage in cost-sharing, and …enhanced self-
monitoring of the artisanal mining sector, with the intended result of reduced smuggling and theft 
of minerals” (Sandhu 2016, 8). The government’s rationale for this move is that given its lack of 
capacity to effectively trace the movement of diamonds from the mines, miners would be willing to 
monitor the movement of stones through peer monitoring – a process akin to setting up organisations 
that would perform the role of a secret police force. As the Deputy Minister of Planning in the 
MLEM noted: 
 
Anything that is found in a community must be taken to the regional offices to be registered. 
The logic is the government can never police that, but the community can do that. As for 
today, everything happening in those communities you know, I know, people know about it. 
But as it is right now, people say it’s the business of the government. What we’re saying is, 
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yes, it’s the government’s business, but it’s also your business (Interview with Deputy 
Minister for Planning, Ministry of Lands, Energy and Mines, Monrovia, 5 May 2017). 
 
During interviews, government officials compared the use of cooperatives as the main conduit for 
the formalisation of artisanal mining, with their “successful use in agriculture over the years”. 
Consequently, the Cooperative Development Agency (CDA), a semi-autonomous institution, has 
been charged with the role of training miners on the workings of cooperatives (Interview with the 
Acting Deputy Registrar of the Cooperative Development Agency, Monrovia, 27 August 2018; 
Interview with Deputy Minister for Planning, Ministry of Lands, Energy and Mines, Monrovia, 5 
May 2017). However, the assumption that cooperatives will be equally successful in formalising 
artisanal mining without any credible evidence is problematic, given that the level of risks prevalent 
in mining is far higher than in agriculture, where a farmer is usually guaranteed some amount of 
harvest, no matter how bad. Unsurprisingly, interviews with miners, supporters and donors 
demonstrated that the process of establishing cooperatives faces significant risks of failure, partly 
due to a severe dearth in knowledge of their use in mining amongst stakeholders. As one donor 
official noted: 
 
When it comes to the issue of the formation through cooperatives…we’ve always said it still 
needs a lot of investigation, a lot of thinking and research. (Interview with Western donor 
official, Monrovia, 2 May 2017). 
 
The consequences of the lack of a sound knowledge base on the conditions under which 
cooperatives can be set up were already manifest before the government was able to secure funding 
to implement its roadmap. Fieldwork revealed that there were extreme discrepancies in the 
perceptions and expectations of stakeholders in relation to what the use of cooperatives would 
achieve for them. For example, while the government expects to increase its revenues from the 
sector, it is not planning to reinvest funds in the organisation of the cooperatives. This stance is 
opposed to that of miners, who do not see a successful implementation of the roadmap without a 
significant injection of financial and other support into the cooperatives, especially amidst 
dwindling alluvial diamond and gold deposits. When asked about their expectations of cooperatives 
during a workshop organised for artisanal miners by the authors, the mining Chairlady of Weajue, 




We were invited to a meeting at Lofa Bridge last year. In the meeting attended by the 
Minister and the people from the CDA, we were told that the government was going to help 
us form cooperatives. We need help from supporters, as it is now difficult to mine here. That 
is why people are leaving here, because to mine you need machines, which we don’t have. 
Only government and investors can help us (Interview with Mining Chairlady, Weajue, 8 
February 2018).  
 
The Chairlady spoke for many of her peers, raising the difficulties that miners face in attracting and 
retaining support in a high risk, low return sector. Moreover, it was pointed out that setting up 
cooperatives without the necessary financial input has resulted in the reinvention of the role of 
brokers, supporters, dealers and exporters. Ironically, these individuals were not included in the 
consultations that led to the development of the roadmap, principally because the government 
thought their presence would have adversely affected deliberations (Interview with Deputy Minister 
for Planning, Ministry of Lands, Energy and Mines, Monrovia, 5 May 2017; Interview with 
President of the Brokers Association, Monrovia, 27 August 2017). During fieldwork, brokers 
expressed concerns that they were not involved in the consultations and feared that the government 
was deliberately targeting them, a claim that Ministers and other government officials refuted. 
Despite this, they have quickly occupied the financial void created after the launch of the roadmap, 
by mobilising and organising miners into cooperatives, paying for their licences and providing all 
the support needed for their operations (Interviews with Cooperative Manager, Mano River Kongo, 
6 February 2018; Cooperative Member, Mano River Kongo, 8 February 2018; CEO, Hard Work 
Cooperative, Mano River Kongo, 5 February 2018).  
 
All the cooperatives operating in Mano River Kongo in Western Liberia at the time of 
fieldwork were set up by Monrovia-based dealers and exporters, some of whom had received 
support from foreign investors (Interviews with Cooperative Manager, Mano River Kongo, 6 
February 2018; Teacher/Miner, Mano River Kongo, 7 February 2018). Building on their fears of 
the government targeting them, the old players – dealers, brokers and exporters – have readjusted 
to the new reform agenda in a way that maintains the old structure of artisanal mining, albeit under 
cooperatives, with investment and sharing arrangements remaining the same. Further, the MLEM’s 
incentive of allowing cooperatives to use heavy machinery on their mining claims, which only the 
brokers, dealers and exporters can afford, has facilitated the emergence of a unique form of mining 
which is neither artisanal nor small-scale – while they are licenced under class C, their mode of 
operations reflects that of Class B licence holders. In interviews with miners, it was noted that 
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although the widespread use of heavy machinery on mining claims provides short-term financial 
benefits for them, it nonetheless represents the biggest threat to the long-term sustainability of their 
livelihoods, as it rapidly depletes the residual alluvial diamond deposits. 
 
In addition, although the government has not committed to providing direct financial support 
to the cooperatives, the promise of indirect support through tax wavers, including on the importation 
of heavy vehicles and machinery, has also incentivised Monrovia-based brokers, dealers and 
exporters. In anticipation of taking advantage of these tax incentives, many individuals have set up 
mining, as well as multi-purpose mining-farming cooperatives, capitalising on the dove-tailing 
nature of agriculture and mining, two economic activities that complement each other in rural West 
Africa (Maconachie and Binns 2007). One exporter who had taken for granted the MLEM’s promise 
of securing tax wavers for the cooperatives on the importation of heavy duty vehicles and 
machinery, was disappointed when the Liberia Revenue Authority insisted he should pay the full 
taxes on heavy duty vehicles he had imported. He subsequently had to reroute the vehicles through 
Sierra Leone, which at the time provided concessions for mining equipment, and then into Liberia 
across the land border (Interview with Cooperative Manager, Mano River Kongo, 6 February 2018). 
While the importer clearly wanted to evade taxes, his experience nonetheless illustrates the 
coordination challenges with which stakeholders have to contend when formulating and 
implementing policies, particularly when faced with different incentives and perceptions of the 
outcomes of reform processes. In this case, a policy promoted by one Ministry – the MLEM – to 
encourage the formalisation of artisanal mining, is undermined by another agency of government – 
the Liberia Revenue authority (LRA) – whose insistence on full tax payment might be influenced 
by revenue collection targets set by the Ministry of Finance, which was also represented in the 
consultations.  
 
Further, interviews and focus group discussions with miners and other local authorities 
suggest that some individuals remain suspicious of the government’s motives, given the tendency 
for cooperatives to facilitate exploitation and elite capture. In Gondor’s Town, Western Liberia, 
miners recounted how a Monrovia-based businessman who had links to government officials and 
the President’s family, had attempted to set up a multi-purpose cooperative in 2012. It was reported 
that he collected monies from the miners as their contribution to registration costs, but actually 
registered the cooperative in the name of his family instead (Focus Group Discussion with Mining 
Chairman, Miners and Patrolmen, Gondor’s Town, 18 May 2017). It was also reported that he was 
given mining and agricultural equipment, as well as rice, but used them for his own private use. This 
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experience seriously dented their belief and confidence in cooperatives as vehicles through which 
they could organise themselves. As one of the miners of the town noted: 
 
When we went to Lofa Bridge, we told them that we wouldn’t agree to people coming from 
outside to … fool us again. For any cooperative that is to be established, our people will have 
to lead it. If not, we’ll not join it (Focus Group Discussion with Mining Chairman, Miners 
and Patrolmen, Gondor’s Town, 18 May 2017).  
 
Clearly, the idealised views held by government officials in relation to the cooperatives’ potential 
to formalise artisanal mining is not shared by the mining communities. Although the roadmap to 
formalisation is yet to be fully implemented, experiences so far have produced a mixed-bag of 
outcomes which have further embedded pre-existing informalities in the sector. 
 
Conclusion 
Local actors, especially those engaged in regulating the artisanal mining sector, are sometimes 
portrayed as being oblivious to the benefits that will accompany formalisation – such as secured 
livelihoods for miners and increased tax revenue for the government. Indeed, much research has 
argued that the preservation of the dual formal and informal mining economies is an “economically 
irrational move for the governments of nation-states” to make (Siegel and Veiga 2009, 52). 
However, the fact that the persistence of informality in the sector can sometimes be rational, at least 
from the point of those who benefit from it, is seldom considered in such analyses. Artisanal mining 
has been at the heart of elite bargaining schemes in Liberia for many years, serving as a source of 
personalised wealth that links Monrovia-based patrons to clients in mining regions. Although the 
imposition of sanctions on the country disrupted these relations mildly, this did not lead to 
significant shifts in officials’ modes of elite capture and accumulation. 
The lifting of diamond export sanctions in 2007 represented a significant opportunity for the 
government to increase revenues from the export of diamonds, and for donors and other external 
actors to jointly work together to carry out structural reforms to the regulation of the sector. Most 
notably, plans to decentralise governance structures within the sector would have gone a long way 
towards streamlining registration and other regulatory processes for miners. However, the failure of 
these plans to materialise and the parallel introduction of the GDO regional officers within a 
reformed mining agent structure highlights the agency of local actors and their ability to hybridise 
reform programmes in ways that preserve their interests. Thus the key challenge that reformers in 
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Liberia are faced with, is how to build in the right incentives for officials across all levels of the 
sector, ensuring that their interests are linked to the broader formalisation agenda. More practical 
steps would involve the government making meaningful investments in the sector, and not shifting 
its responsibilities to mining agents, while improving their employment terms. The roadmap has 
already identified the decentralisation of the licensing process as one of the key activities to be 
undertaken. However, without substantial investment in physical and training infrastructure, this 
process is unlikely to be carried out in the short to medium term. 
Although the development of the Regulatory Roadmap for the Artisanal Mining Sector is, 
by and large, intended by the government to serve as a coping strategy in the midst of dwindling 
iron ore revenues, it nonetheless provides an opportunity for actors to re-engage in the sector. In 
terms of donor interventions, the eight clearly mapped out policy themes provide a framework 
through which strategic decisions in programming can be made. However, some of the themes 
explored in this article – such as the piloting of umbrella organisations or cooperatives – will prove 
more difficult to achieve than others. The evidence so far illustrates that the development of 
cooperatives to formalise artisanal mining is problematic, as dealers, brokers, exporters and other 
Monrovia-based businessman have used them as vehicles to perpetuate pre-existing forms of 
resource capture and revenue sharing arrangements in the sector. Ultimately, one of the biggest 
challenges for rolling out a formalised artisanal mining sector in Liberia will continue to be the 
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